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ABSTRACT 
Open innovation provides significant advantages for individual firms and 
may generate wider social benefits. Positive externalities related to 
knowledge sharing may result from openness itself, and enhanced levels of 
innovation may lead to otherwise unachieved innovation spillovers. A 
number of studies have suggested, however, that average levels of OI 
activity remain well below the level which maximises innovation outputs. 
Here, we identify four market failures which arise in the process of OI 
partnership formation and which may be limiting firms OI engagement. 
Information failures occur which mean firms are unaware of the benefits of 
OI, lack information on the capabilities of partners and their 
trustworthiness. Appropriability issues may also mean that levels of OI 
remain below the social optimum.  We develop policy responses to each 
market failure linked to the development of an OI intermediary and develop 
a related logic model.  
 
Keywords: Open Innovation, intermediary, market failure 
JEL Codes: O32, L1, O38; Q34; L26 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
To date research on open innovation (OI) has focussed largely on the 
benefits to individual firms and the strategic and operational requirements 
of implementing open innovation (Sieg, Wallin, and von Krogh 2010; Hung 
and Chiang 2010; Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler 2009). For example, 
partnering in the innovation process has been found to stimulate creativity, 
reduce risk, accelerate or upgrade the quality of the innovations made, and 
signal the quality of firms’ innovation activities (Powell 1998). In addition to 
the private benefits for firms engaging in OI there is also emerging 
evidence of the wider social benefits that may arise. Stronger social and 
relational capital arising from OI partnerships will strengthen the innovation 
system generating externalities from openness during the innovation 
process (Roper et al. 2014) and externalities from resulting innovation  
(Beugelsdijck and Cornet 2001).  Yet, despite our knowledge of the 
antecedents and consequences of OI from an organisational and strategic 
management perspective, we understand less well how firms’ operating 
context can influence the adoption of OI practices. Specifically, are there 
market failures that reduce levels of OI activity and the related benefits? 
And, if so how should policy-makers respond?  
Interest in policy intervention to overcome weaknesses in innovation 
systems is well-established, particularly in terms of measures to stimulate 
R&D and innovation. By contrast, and despite the potential for benefits 
accruing to both individual firms as well as the wider innovation system, 
relatively little attention has been focussed on the policy implications of OI1. 
This is surprising given that research on innovation systems has 
consistently emphasised the potential value of innovation partnering and 
the level of ‘association’ in a particular region (Cooke and Morgan 1998). 
Where systemic failures are limiting flows of knowledge or impeding the 
functioning of the innovation system (OECD 1999) there may be a role for 
                                               
1 Although see Chesbrough, H and Vanhaverbeke, W (2011) ‘Open innovation and 
public policy in Europe’, ESADE Business School which provides some broadly 
based recommendations for the development of OI in Europe.  
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policy intervention to creating regional advantages (Asheim et al. 2007; 
Shyu and Chiu 2002 ; Hewitt-Dundas and Roper 2011). 
Our argument proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we outline the empirical 
regularity we seek to understand - a situation where observed levels of OI 
activity are well below the level which would maximise firms’ and regions’ 
innovation performance. Our conceptualisation of the issues involved 
focusses on the private and wider social benefits of open innovation, and 
identifies four market failures which mean that these benefits are not 
generally realised. Informational failures relating to the likely rewards from 
OI mean that firms cannot fully appreciate the potential private benefits, 
and therefore under-invest in OI. More standard market failures relating to 
firms’ inability to appropriate the wider social benefits which arise from OI 
also prove important. The market failures we identify suggest a case for 
policy intervention to broaden the adoption of OI and, in Section 4, we 
develop policy responses designed to address each market failure. Our 
analysis contributes to the conceptual understanding of OI decisions by 
firms, and the implications in terms of the private and social benefits which 
may arise.  
 
2. PROFILING THE BENEFITS OF OPEN 
INNOVATION 
2.1 Private benefits  
Open Innovation (OI) has been defined as ‘… the use of purposive inflows 
and outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and expand 
the markets for external use of innovation, respectively’ (Chesborough 
2006, p. 1). OI activity may therefore be: through inbound mechanisms, 
and knowledge flows from outside to inside the firm; through outbound 
mechanisms, where knowledge flows from inside the firm to the outside; or, 
through a blend of both inbound and outbound mechanisms.  In their 
analysis of the responses to a survey of innovators in the UK Cosh et al. 
(2011) identified three clusters of innovators: ‘Closed’ innovators – those 
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not engaging with any external partners for innovation - who accounted for 
32.1 per cent of innovative firms; ‘Hunters’ engaged primarily in inbound 
open innovation, which accounted for 41.9 per cent of innovators; and, 
‘ambidextrous innovators’ - the 25.9 per cent of firms who were engaged 
both in inbound and outbound open innovation. It is perhaps unsurprising 
therefore that the majority of empirical studies of OI have focused on 
inbound OI partnerships (Love and Roper 2013).  
There is substantial evidence of the positive relationship between 
innovation and productivity (Crepon et al. 1998; Loof and Heshmati 2002) 
and innovation and business growth (Anyadike-Danes et al. 2009). The 
evidence suggests that openness in innovation can also significantly 
enhance business’ financial and strategic performance (Love, Roper, and 
Bryson 2011)2.    Nambisan and Sawhney (2007) succinctly organise the 
private benefits arising from OI along four dimensions: increasing the reach 
of firms in identifying new ideas, technologies and markets; reducing the 
cost of innovation through partnerships with other organisations; similarly, 
reducing the risk of commercialising new ideas, technologies or products; 
and increasing the speed of development from idea to innovation3. These 
private benefits arise from the asymmetric nature of firms’ (and other non-
corporate organisations’) resources and competencies.  Heterogeneity in 
capabilities creates the potential for learning (Dosi 1997) through inter-
organisational collaboration and the subsequent transfer of tacit and 
explicit knowledge: also referred to as ‘vicarious learning’ (Ingram and 
Baum, 1997). At the same time, the knowledge and learning that is gained 
from external sources tends to be complementary to internal capabilities - 
and in particular R&D - in shaping innovation performance (Roper, Du, and 
Love 2008). As a result, considerable attention has been paid to firms’ 
                                               
2  Performance benefits arising from OI engagement reflect partnering benefits 
associated with other organisational activities such as supply chain management 
(Bharadwaj, 2000) with Dyer and Singh (1998) identifying mutually beneficial 
relational rents arising from suppliers and firms combining knowledge in novel 
ways. 
3  The innovation benefits of inward OI have been observed across both 
manufacturing and service sector firms (Love, Roper, and Bryson 2011) as well as 
traditional and high-tech manufacturing sectors (Spithoven, Clarysse, and 
Knockaert 2011; Chiaroni, Chiesa, and Frattini 2010; Huang 2011).  
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absorptive capacity (Cosh et al. 2011) as a proxy for their ability to engage 
in OI, how the strength of absorptive capacity varies for engaging in supply 
chain as compared to university OI collaborations (Schmidt 2010), and in 
particular, how SMEs may be constrained in engaging in OI due to weaker 
absorptive capacity (Chesbrough 2010; Van de Vrande et al. 2009). 
Weaker absorptive capacity in SMEs may also render them as less 
attractive innovation partners to large firms and other innovation public 
sector organisations. 
Learning may be evident in various ways, e.g. financially where external 
linkages increase firms’ ability to appropriate the returns from innovation, or 
technologically as firms search the environment systematically, facilitating 
access to improved technology developed elsewhere (Laursen and Salter, 
2006; Niosi, 2003). Because the success of any innovation process is 
uncertain, firms may also have an incentive to develop several external 
linkages at the same time: having more linkages or more different types of 
linkages increases the probability of obtaining useful knowledge from 
outside of the firm (Leiponen and Helfat 2010).  
Alongside its innovation benefits, disadvantages may also arise from 
engaging in OI.  For example, firms may limit their use of OI partnerships 
due to difficulties in defending their own intellectual property rights 
(Lichtenthaler 2010). Transaction and coordination costs (Alston and 
Gillespie, 1989) may also deter firms’ engagement in OI: the costs of 
searching for new OI partnerships may be substantial, and having a larger 
number of partnerships may lead to monitoring and management problems 
in addition to the absorption of knowledge simultaneously from a large 
number of sources (Sieg, Wallin, and von Krogh 2010; Laursen and Salter 
2006). Due to these cognitive limits firms are likely to have a ‘saturation’ 
level in the number of partnerships, where the innovation benefits are 
maximised. Beyond this level, the addition of another partnership will result 
in diminishing innovation performance.  
The benefits of OI therefore have limits, with a standard finding being an 
inverted U-shape relationship between the number of partnerships and 
firms’ innovation performance (Laursen and Salter 2006; Leiponen and 
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Helfat 2010; Vahter, Love, and Roper 2014). This suggests a tipping-point 
or optimum beyond which the innovation benefits of openness actually 
decline. Table 1 summarises the result of a series of econometric studies 
using different innovation indicators which identify an inverted U-shape 
relationship between openness and innovation and highlights two standard 
characteristics of these studies. First, the shape of the openness-
innovation relationship, and therefore the position of the tipping-point or 
optimum level of openness, differs significantly between micro, small and 
larger firms. Second, in each study the actual mean level of openness 
observed is well to the left of the tipping point or optimum. In other words, 
by developing additional open innovation relationships firms have, on 
average, the potential to benefit from increased levels of innovation.  
Kim et al (2010) provide a useful process framework for assessing how 
these benefits may arise in inter-firm or other inter-organisational 
relationships. They identify four distinct stages in the development of such 
relationships: (i) identifying strategic needs, (ii) assessing and selecting a 
partner, (iii) implementing a partnership, and (iv) re-assessing and re-
shaping the partnership (Kim et al., 2010). The first three of these stages 
are of particular relevance to our analysis as they represent the process 
which occurs prior to any returns from OI being realised4. The first stage - 
‘identifying strategic needs’ - relates to the firm developing an awareness of 
the need to form a collaborative relationship and the value of such a 
relationship. It also involves preparatory work by the company in 
determining its expectations and requirements from the partnership.  In the 
second stage - ‘assessing and selecting a partner’ - active search and 
selection of potential partners occurs. This may involve establishing clear 
criteria for partner selection along with mechanisms and measures to 
evaluate potential partners. Third, having selected a partner or partners, 
the next stage - ‘implementing a partnership’- involves formalising the 
collaboration, operationalising the activity surrounding the engagement and 
managing the relationship. Finally ‘reassessing and reshaping the 
                                               
4  These stages have however tended to be overlooked in the literature in 
preference for focusing on value creation and performance benefits e.g. new 
products, arising from collaborative partnerships (Lee et al. 2010). 
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partnership’ is concerned with the longer term strategic development of the 
partnership where engagement is monitored, evaluated and the 
relationship refined over time.      
Information failures may occur at each of these stages which collectively 
reduce firms’ engagement with OI. In relation to the first stage of identifying 
strategic needs, information failures may exist which mean that firms are 
unaware of the potential benefits of OI, or are unable to predict the likely 
(private) returns.  This lack of awareness of the benefits of OI seems likely 
to mean that firms will either fail to engage in OI activity or, where they do 
engage in OI, that they will under-invest in forming OI partnerships and 
potentially in the internal capabilities required for effective open innovation 
(Spithoven, Clarysse, and Knockaert 2011). For example, extant research 
has pointed to a learning effect from innovation partnerships, which is 
strengthened as firms increase the number of alliances and diversity of 
partners (Reuer et al. 2002; Laursen and Salter 2006; Leiponen and Helfat 
2010). This may reflect learning-by-using as firms which undertake OI – or 
observe others undertaking open innovation learn to appreciate the 
potential benefits and are better able to predict and maximise the private 
returns (McWilliams and Zilbermanfr 1996).  
The second stage in the partnership formation process (Kim et al. 2010) 
involves assessing and selecting partners.  At this stage, incomplete or 
asymmetric information on potential partners’ functional capabilities may 
lead either to a failure to identify appropriate partners or the establishment 
of OI relationships with the wrong partners. That is, a market failure occurs 
through limited information on the functional capabilities of potential 
partners. This has been described as adverse selection and occurs pre-
contractually. Where the wrong partners are selected this can result in 
inferior outputs (Kivisto, 2005). Lee et al. (2010, 293) suggest that this 
information failure and the potential to select the wrong partner is 
particularly acute for small businesses due to more limited capability and 
financial resources to acquire partner information as compared to larger 
firms ‘who can often afford professional intelligence processes for scanning 
and monitoring their technological environments’. Both may mean that 
  
 
11 
firms fail to maximise the potential private benefits of OI.  
In the third stage of the partnership formation process (Kim et al. 2010) - 
implementing the partnership - market failures may arise through limited 
information on the trustworthiness of partners. Even where firms have 
complete information on the functional capabilities of potential OI partners, 
asymmetric information in terms of potential partners’ strategic aspirations 
or trustworthiness may result in the establishment of relationships with 
inappropriate or inadequate governance mechanisms. Innovation 
undertaken through OI partnerships may be more complex than internal or 
closed innovation activities therefore creating greater potential for moral 
hazard and opportunistic behaviour (Kwon and Suh, 2005), which is 
exacerbated where behaviour is difficult to observe and monitor (Kivisto, 
2008).   
Effective supply chain partnerships have been found to depend on mutual 
trust, openness and shared risk and rewards (Lambert et al. 2004). This is 
perhaps even more important for OI relationships where R&D activities and 
associated outputs and outcomes are difficult to articulate and behaviour is 
hard to monitor (Kivisto 2008).  In such circumstances a partner may act in 
their own self-interest or may devote insufficient effort, leading to poor 
quality outputs (Kivisto 2008). Innovation partners may therefore 
misrepresent their performance with this again reducing the returns to OI 
below the private optimal level. One approach to overcoming a lack of trust 
between partners is through legally enforceable contracts.  This then 
safeguards the innovation process between partners and the appropriation 
of rents.  However, research on buyer-supplier relationships (Wang et al. 
2008) found that trust between partners was more important than 
contractual arrangements in stimulating creativity.  
Any of these information failures which mean that firms are unable to 
accurately assess the benefits of OI, assess partners’ capabilities or 
trustworthiness may lead firms to under-invest in OI relative to their private 
optimum. This may explain why in empirical studies the average levels of 
OI activity observed are always significantly lower than the level which 
would make the maximum contribution to innovation (Table 1). Reducing 
  
 
12 
the extent of these information failures may encourage firms to move closer 
to the optimum level of OI, the point where the marginal costs and benefits 
of openness are equal. This is not the whole story, however, as OI can 
have wider social benefits and these are the focus of the next section. 
2.2 Social benefits 
Over and above the benefits to an individual firm from adopting OI, there 
may also be wider social benefits. These social benefits arise through two 
main mechanisms: externalities of openness and externalities from 
improved innovation. Innovation externalities occur as a result of the 
outputs of firms’ innovation processes, i.e. the new products, services or 
processes they introduce. The benefits arising from these innovation are 
not confined to the firm conducting the activity, but instead extend to other 
organisations 5 . Such innovation spillovers arise when ‘quality 
improvements by a supplier are not fully translated into higher prices for the 
buyer(s). Productivity gains are then recorded in a different firm or industry 
than the one that generated the productivity gains in the first place. Rent 
spillovers occur in input-output relations’ (Beugelsdijck and Cornet 2001, p. 
3). The extent of innovation spillovers therefore depends crucially on the 
scope of value-chain interactions between a firm and other regional 
organisations.  The implication of this is that where the regional business 
ecosystem is strong (Clarysse et al. 2014) there is potential to further 
strengthen it. For example, the stronger are local supply chains and other 
market interactions (e.g. joint-ventures or licensing agreements), the 
stronger will be any OI spillovers. Where local linkages are weaker, 
localised ‘rent-based’ OI spillovers will also be more limited. Indeed, 
Clarysse et al. (2014) suggest that where firms operate mainly in non-
regional markets and the regional business ecosystem is weak, then it is 
questionable the extent to which promoting greater OI will strengthen the 
business ecosystem.  Yet, assuming some supply chain and collaborative 
                                               
5 Menon (2015) suggests that these externalities are geographically constrained 
with the benefits being shaped by the extent of coherence between organisations 
through feedback systems or loops, common developmental trajectories and 
complementary competencies between agents (Edquist, 2004). 
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development within the region, OI will enhance private organisational 
benefits and innovation spillovers (Czarnitzki and Kraft 2012; Kesidou and 
Romijn 2008; Moreno, Paci, and Usai 2005; Audretsch 2005; Beugelsdijck 
and Cornet 2001) alongside strengthening of the knowledge and business 
ecosystem (Clarysse et al. 2014).  
Empirical investigation of the externalities of openness which occur during, 
and as a result of the innovation process, is at an early stage. However, 
one recent study concludes that ‘… the presence of firms that have a large 
range of knowledge linkages appears to benefit other firms in the same 
sector in terms of innovation productivity. The econometric evidence clearly 
suggests the presence of externalities of openness, even after accounting 
for other sector or time-specific effects and other controls …. a one unit 
increase in the average breadth of sectoral linkages is associated with 18-
29 per cent higher innovation performance at the firm level’ (Roper, Vahter, 
and Love 2013). 
Externalities of openness may arise from more extensive knowledge 
diffusion in sectors in which technology has some of the characteristics of a 
public good, and/or sectors which are more densely networked (Kovacs et 
al. 2006). Knowledge diffusion may also be greater where spatially 
bounded or concentrated networks facilitate ‘buzz’, or intensive face-to-
face interaction between network members (Storper and Venables 2004). 
In particular, in knowledge intensive industries, the importance of buzz and 
face-to-face interaction have been associated with the diffusion of tacit 
knowledge or emerging knowledge which has yet to be codified (Asheim, 
Coenen, and Vang 2007). Combinations of buzz and the availability of 
knowledge which has quasi-public characteristics may be particularly 
powerful in generating positive externalities of openness, raising firms 
innovation productivity above that suggested by firms’ private investments 
in knowledge creation and external search.  
Externalities of openness might also occur in relation to imitation and 
demonstration effects similar to those suggested in the technology 
adoption literature (Rao and Kishore 2010). Here, externalities of openness 
may arise as firms respond to openness in the sector by becoming more 
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open themselves. Similarly, labour mobility may spread an awareness of 
the benefits of openness as employees move between firms or establish 
new companies.  
Positive spillovers from innovation and externalities from openness itself 
mean that the socially optimal level of OI will be greater than which reflects 
purely the private benefits. Even in a situation of full information – where 
firms are able to accurately assess the benefits of OI and partners’ 
capabilities and trustworthiness – firms would stop investing in OI at the 
private optimum. Encouraging firms to continue to invest in OI beyond the 
private optimum will require public intervention to shift firms’ cost-benefit 
calculation to maximise the potential for to positive externalities from OI. 
This argument directly parallels the standard justification for public R&D 
and innovation support with its benefits to generate positive externalities 
(Crespo, Fontoura, and Proenca 2009; Norberg-Bohm 2000; Mohnen 
1996)6.  
3. POLICY RESPONSES TO MARKET FAILURES 
Having established the process through which firms initiate and undertake 
partnerships (Kim et al. 2010) and the related market failures, we are 
interested here in how policy can respond to increase level of OI activity 
towards the social optimum.  
One possible approach is the establishment and support of intermediary 
organisations. While the notion of intermediary organisations in supporting 
business activities is not new, the move towards more open innovation 
processes has refocused policy interest on the value of mediation7. This is 
                                               
6  This is warranted by analysis of the positive externalities from R&D and 
innovation which suggest that these effects can be significant (Mansfield et al. 
1977), strongly localised (Ceh 2009; Feldman 2003) and vary markedly by 
technology type (van Beers and van der Panne 2011; Kesidou, Caniels, and 
Romijn 2009; Moreno, Paci, and Usai 2005; Fritsch and Franke 2004). 
7  See, for example, Watkins and Horley (1986) who explored the role of 
intermediaries in supporting technology transfer to small firms. See also Mantel 
and Rosseger (1987) and Gould and Fernandez (1989).  
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particularly the case in regions where there are inherent institutional 
weaknesses in their innovation systems.  
Clarysse et al. (2014) emphasize the importance of an ‘anchor/keystone 
player’ (p. 1174) in efforts to strengthen the local business- or knowledge-
ecosystem.  However, as they found in Flanders, and in common with 
many peripheral regions, leading corporations or knowledge generators 
such as universities may be absent, resulting in system failure (Woolthuis 
et al. 2005).  In this situation, policy makers may attempt to overcome 
system imperfections through public procurement initiatives to stimulate the 
business ecosystem (e.g. SBIR in the USA), or through establishing 
intermediaries to act as boundary spanners (Howells 2006; Clarysse et al. 
2014).  Yet, even in regions where an anchor player is present, a role for 
intermediaries may still exist in overcoming the limitations of technological 
or value-chain networks associated with an anchor player.  
Intermediaries have been defined in different ways, largely reflecting the 
activities that they were established to perform.  In most cases they act as 
a broker in facilitating relationships between at least two actors.  In other 
words, they are ‘actors who create spaces and opportunities for 
appropriation and generation of emerging technical or cultural products by 
others who might be described as developers and users’ (Stewart and 
Hyysalo 2008, p. 296).  A number of recent studies have focused 
specifically on the role of intermediaries in promoting innovation.  For 
example, Howells (2006) in synthesising existing research on 
intermediaries in the innovation process presents a typology of 
intermediaries.  Similar to other authors (Seaton and Cordey-Hayes 1993; 
Hargadon and Sutton 1997), Howells finds that while the activities 
undertaken by an intermediary are often heterogeneous, and much broader 
than originally conceived, they tend to centre around three activities: 
‘scanning and recognition; communication and assimilation; and 
application’ (Howells 2006, p. 720). As such, intermediaries’ efforts are 
aligned with the market failures outlined earlier: helping firms to overcome 
the limitations of incomplete information through promoting recognition of 
the potential benefits of OI; reducing the risk of adverse selection of 
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innovation partner by communicating information on the functional 
capabilities of other firms and non-private sector organisations; and, 
helping to mitigate risk associated with the trustworthiness of partners by 
strengthening social ties and facilitating contractual agreements 8 . More 
specifically, we can define the potential roles of an intermediary focussed 
on promoting OI activity in terms of seven activities designed to address 
the market failures defined earlier (Table 2).   
3.1 Building awareness and capacity  
An intermediary organisation may help overcome firms’ lack of awareness 
of the benefits of OI in three ways: (a) building firms’ awareness of OI as a 
beneficial approach to innovation; (b) acting as an advocate in policy and 
cultural efforts to promote OI; (c) supporting the development of firms’ 
capabilities to engage in OI. Each may help to address the related market 
failure.  
Measures to build awareness of the benefits of collaborative and open-
innovation could include events or network based activities, involve 
broadcast and other media and the compilation and publication of case-
study evidence. Benefits arising from these activities are largely cultural 
and social. An example of a publicly funded intermediary seeking to build 
awareness of OI is the European Regional Development Fund supported 
Innovation-University Enterprise Network (I-UEN) based at Coventry 
University, UK. This was formed as a response to low levels of innovative 
activity in the West Midlands with I-UEN performing a range of intermediary 
                                               
8 Although Howells (2006) acknowledges the potential for intermediaries to make a 
systemic contribution ‘in improving connectedness within a system, particularly 
through bridging ties, but also in its ‘animateur’ role of creating new possibilities 
and dynamism within a system’ (p. 726), the nature of this is not developed. Some 
other attempts e.g. Lee et al. (2010) have sought to develop this further, arguing 
that the role played by intermediaries comprises three activities: developing a 
network database to enable partner matching; network construction in providing 
objective information on each partner; and network management in supporting the 
collaboration process.   
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activities including awareness and capability building, network facilitation 
and structuring9. 
An OI intermediary could also work as a champion or advocate for OI within 
a regional innovation system, supporting and encouraging the development 
of policy measures which strengthen collaboration. Advocacy may also 
involve promoting a region externally as one characterised by OI 
(Luukkonen 2005; Oke, Idiagbon-Oke, and Walumbwa 2008).  An example 
is the Holst Centre, established in 2005 as a joint initiative by the Dutch 
and Flemish governments “to facilitate cross-fertilisation of university and 
industry research towards the development of technologies at a pre-
competitive stage” (Mina et al. 2009, p.20). It aims to create a neutral 
platform for all partners to make new contacts and initiate new business 
relationships as well as strengthening the current ones. The Centre 
similarly takes on the advocacy and the network construction roles (Mina, 
Connell, and Hughes 2009)10. 
Capability building may also be an OI intermediary function to help firms 
develop OI capabilities for managing external relationships or collaborative 
innovation. This is essentially associated with firm’s absorptive capacity - 
the ability to acquire, assimilate, transform and exploit knowledge – and the 
ability to benefit from OI. Weaker absorptive capacity may be less 
detrimental at the stage of scanning the external environment but it 
becomes much more critical as firms attempt to assimilate, transform and 
exploit this knowledge (Abrussa and Coenders, 2007). Indeed, where 
absorptive capacity is particularly low ‘it neither offers anything of value to 
other firms nor provides a capacity to acquire and exploit knowledge that 
others may have’ (Giuliani and Bell 2005, p.50). There are relatively few 
examples of public sector efforts to support capability building for OI, 
however the InnovationXchange (IXC) UK Ltd run a programme called ‘IXC 
                                               
9  Sources:http://wwwm.coventry.ac.uk/researchnet/enterprise/business/Pages/I-
UEN.aspx  accessed 6th March 2016; 
http://www.j4bgrants.co.uk/News.aspx?WCI=htmResults&WCU=CBC=View,SEAR
CH=FT%3DBusiness%2BFunding~pFF%3D255,DSCODE=J4BGRB,NEWSITEMI
D=38-N39821 accessed 6th March 2016.  
10 See also: www.holstcentre.com. 
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Connect’ focused on training staff in businesses on core innovation skills, 
designed to increase the target organisation’s capacity to want, find, get 
and manage innovation opportunities11. 
3.2 Enabling partner selection  
As discussed earlier, OI is multi-dimensional, involving inbound technology 
acquisition, outbound technology and knowledge exploitation or a 
combination of both (Gassman and Enkel, 2004). Some evidence exists to 
suggest that for medium and low-tech sectors, inbound OI dominates with 
firms searching the external environment for technologies or knowledge 
that can complement and diversity existing capabilities. In other words, 
inbound OI acts as a substitute to internal R&D investment. In these 
sectors third parties such as OI intermediaries may be important in helping 
to scan the market for emerging technologies, develop the ability to absorb 
the technology acquired and to perform complementary R&D if needed 
(Spithoven et al. 2011). By contrast, for firms in high-tech sectors, 
outbound OI may be more common with absorptive capacity (R&D 
investment and skills) enhancing the stock of accumulated knowledge 
within the firm and the possibility of this being exploited externally. In these 
sectors, OI intermediaries play a potentially different role with less focus on 
capability building and more on assisting firms to identify and collaborate 
with potential exploitation partners. 
An OI intermediary might also help firms to identify potential OI partners. 
Where the resource and capability requirements belong to a distant partner 
then the role of the intermediary will be more important in overcoming both 
physical and cognitive distances. An OI intermediary might also promote 
the capabilities of firms as potential partners to organisations elsewhere. 
This is primarily a marketing and/or promotional activity and again may best 
be delivered through partnership with external facing organisations. An 
example of an organisation playing both roles is the Enterprise Europe 
Network. This is a Europe-wide network of 600 partner organisations 
                                               
11 Source: http://www.ixc-uk.com/ accessed 7 March 2016. 
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spanning over 50 countries. Targeting SMEs it provides ‘a trustworthy 
source of information, advisory and partnership services for European 
companies looking to innovate and expand’. The Enterprise Europe 
Network reports that it supports c. 380k businesses per year through c. 90k 
business connections per year12. 
3.3 Brokering effective relationships  
The potential for cheating in OI relationships suggests the importance of 
trust and that a public intermediary organisation should act as an honest 
and independent broker in facilitating network, technology and knowledge 
partnerships. This impartiality is likely to be fundamental to the success of 
public intervention, particularly in terms of the partner search, facilitation 
and structuring activities. For smaller firms in particular, innovation 
processes are generally less formally structured and professionalised than 
those in larger firms (Van de Vrande et al. 2009).  Here, the intermediary 
may proactively facilitate cooperative partnerships with firms in a way which 
fosters trust between the partners and/or actively engage in structuring the 
partnerships through developing contractual agreements.  
Through brokering activity an intermediary works with individual firms to 
establish new innovation partnerships. This is likely to involve trust-building 
activities alongside more detailed investigation of the value added in 
specific partnerships and may involve elements of network building with 
both local and potentially external partners 13 . Intermediaries may also 
assist with the structuring of partnerships and collaboration to assist firms 
with the structuring of OI relationships and is likely to require detailed work 
with the partners on the development of contractual and managerial 
structures. For example, Technology advisors in the Collective Research 
Centres (CRCs) in Belgium function as a bridge between businesses and 
the Collective Research Centres (Spithoven, Clarysse, and Knockaert 
2011). They act as the first point of contact for businesses in a specific 
                                               
12  Source: http://een.ec.europa.eu/news/news/bringing-success-26-million-smes 
accessed 7 March 2016. 
13 The credibility of individual brokers is likely to be key to success in this activity - 
see (Lee et al. 2010) and (Zeng, Xie, and Tam 2010). 
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industry looking to resolve technical problems and broker relationships 
between the CRCs and individual businesses. Similar to the CRCs, 
brokering activity is also typical of innovation focussed incubators e.g. 
Chalmers Innovation which is linked to the broader Swedish Incubators and 
Science parks (SISP) network, the Innovationsbron Sweden which is a 
nationwide network of the strongest incubators in Sweden, with both of 
these networks enhancing the opportunities for OI and growth potential of 
tenants14.  
Overcoming the three informational market failures in Stages 1 to 3 above, 
may encourage firms to increase levels of OI towards the private optimum 
with potential private and social benefits. But this will not be sufficient on 
their own to encourage firms beyond the private optimum and so maximise 
social benefits of OI. Here the fourth market failure arises, associated with 
firms’ inability to appropriate positive innovation and openness 
externalities. This is similar to arguments associated with the under-
investment in R&D or innovation (Arrow, 1962) and is standardly 
addressed through provision of grants or subsidies for R&D or innovative 
activity.  
3.4 Maximising social returns from OI  
Public incentives for collaborative R&D and innovation can positively 
influence the cost-benefit ratio which firms perceive in considering their OI 
activity and increasing activity levels. Evidence from a number of studies 
suggest that innovation grants and subsidies (Cunningham et al. 2013) 
make collaboration more attractive, with evidence that this leads to an 
overall increase in the level of collaborative activity (Falk, 2007; Breschi et 
al. 2009, Knockaert et al. 2014). Similarly, a review of R&D programme 
evaluations across 11 countries concluded that firms in receipt of public 
support were more likely to collaborate with other businesses (OECD 
                                               
14  See: np.netpublicator.com/np/n88592986/SiSP-catalogue_low2010.pdf. In 
addition to this, widely cited examples of innovation intermediaries that draw on 
crowdsourcing to solve technical and market problems include NineSigma, 
Innocentive, Yet2.com and YourEncoure. 
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2006). In other words, RDI support led to the development of inter-
organisational collaboration with the associated knowledge transfer and 
learning.  This suggests that where public subsidies for innovation 
encourage firms to broaden or deepen their external innovation linkages 
this generates inter-organisational additionality.  
3.5 Logic model and evaluation 
A logic model links the objectives of any policy intervention to its goals, 
activities and anticipated inputs, outputs and outcomes (Donaldson and 
Gooler 2003). The logic model also provides a type of balanced scorecard 
ensuring that any OI intermediary balances its efforts across the range of 
possible activities (Figure 2). To facilitate accurate evaluation of the 
effectiveness of intervention a baseline level of awareness of OI would 
need to be determined, with objectives then set, against which 
developments in the output and outcome metrics could then be compared. 
The manner by which intervention is operationalised will be reflected in the 
programme activities reflecting the stages in partnership formation and 
efforts to overcome associated market failures. (Figure 2). As such Stage 1 
of identifying strategic needs driving OI will be reflected in activities 
addressing issues of lack of awareness, advocacy and capacity 
development.  Stage 2 of assessing and selecting a partner will be 
addressed through activities providing partner information, while Stage 3 of 
implementing a partnership will arise through facilitation and structuring 
activities. For each activity we provide an illustrative set of measurable 
input indicators, short-term output indicators and longer-term outcome 
measures. Input indicators and output indicators are in the main activity 
specific, whereas outcome indicators reflect the longer-term progress of the 
OI intermediary towards its main objective of increasing the level of OI in a 
region.  
Another element of any logic model relates to the contingencies associated 
with any intervention. In terms of an OI intermediary, for example, a 
significant difference may exist in the timeframe for achieving outputs and 
outcomes: impact and output measures would be available in a relatively 
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short time-scale, but outcome indicators would only be measurable over 
perhaps a 3-5 year time horizon. Second, it may be difficult to attribute 
causality to any one activity of an OI intermediary as firms working with the 
intermediary are likely to take part in a range of activities. Indeed, this may 
be desirable. Third, it will be important to recognise the extent to which the 
intermediary itself has ‘control’ over the various activities being supported 
or services being provided. Clearly where these are within the intermediary 
these will be within its control. However, a clear possibility is that services 
will be provided in partnership with other organisations – either public or 
private sector – and the quality of these activities will often be outside the 
control of the intermediary. Fourth, it will be important to recognise the 
strongly contingent nature of outcomes. These may, for example, be 
strongly conditional on market conditions. Strong growth in Europe for 
example may encourage firms to develop new products for European 
markets with clear implications for the outcome measures. Slow growth in 
Europe may have the opposite effect. Over the time horizon of the outcome 
measures such contingent factors are likely to be a significant influence. 
However, one possibility of mitigating the effect of such contingent factors 
may be to compare outcome indicators in the region to similar metrics for 
other regions or economies. 
4. CONCLUSION 
As the innovation process becomes more distributed and iterative, OI 
becomes more central to an effective and efficient business innovation 
process.  The private returns from engaging in OI are well documented 
although less attention has been paid to the wider social benefits. In this 
paper we contribute to existing conceptualisations of the determinants of OI 
by adopting a public policy perspective. In particular, we consider the 
process by which OI partnerships are formed and related market failures 
which may help explain the empirical regularity that observed levels of OI 
activity are always below the level which would maximise its innovation 
benefits (Table 1). These market failures are predominantly associated 
with: (i) information asymmetries concerning an awareness of the potential 
benefits of OI; (ii) limited information on the functional capabilities of 
  
 
23 
potential partners whether for inbound or outbound OI; and, (iii) limited 
information on the trustworthiness of potential partners. In addition, we 
argue that given the potential for positive spillovers from both openness 
itself and the enhanced level of innovation resulting from OI, addressing 
these three market failures would still result in levels of OI activity below the 
socially optimum. As a result there is the case for further intervention 
through incentives to directly promote OI. Drawing on prior research on 
intermediary organisations we propose seven roles which intermediaries 
might perform in addressing the market failures and provide examples of 
each type of policy intervention – an eighth being direct subsidies for OI 
(collaborative innovation) activities.   
While the underlying mechanisms of OI partnership formation and the 
associated market failures are generic to all regions and firms, their impact 
will be context specific. The extent to which system failures exist in the 
business or knowledge-ecosystem will vary (Woolthuis et al. 2005), with 
institutional failures most apparent in peripheral regions (Clarysse et al. 
2014). Variations will also exist in the organisational and industrial structure 
across peripheral and less economically advanced regions. This contextual 
complexity (Zhara and Wright 2011) may affect intermediary’s priorities 
across each of the OI stages and market failures. For example, where firms 
are aware of the importance of OI and have the internal capability and 
capacity to engage in OI, then greater emphasis may be needed on 
identifying appropriate partners and structuring the relationships.  
Alternatively, in those regions with particularly low levels of innovation 
and/or OI, greater emphasis may be needed in raising firms’ awareness of 
the benefits of OI and developing the capability to engage.  
In addition to the innovation capability of a region’s firms, differences will 
also exist between regions in industrial structure and the presence of 
appropriate OI partners. Where suitable innovation partners are absent in a 
region then an intermediary’s focus will need to be more inter-regional and 
international. Activities around identifying appropriate partners and 
providing information, along with managing the OI engagement are likely to 
be important in such contexts. The challenge for intervention here is in 
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balancing a state-centred policy in an international environment where the 
benefits are not all captured in the political jurisdiction (Kuhlmann et al. 
2010).  
Beyond contextual specificities which influence an OI intermediary’s 
priorities, variations may also exist in the need for, and potential impact of, 
intervention across the population of firms.  As discussed earlier, smaller 
firms are significantly less likely to engage in OI although the benefits may 
be greater than those for larger firms (Vahter et al. 2014). Evidence on the 
importance of each market failure for firms of different sizes is limited, 
however, although for micro-firms market failures around the lack of 
trustworthiness of OI partners are more common than a lack of awareness 
of the benefits of OI or information on potential partners (Hewitt-Dundas 
and Roper, 2016). Organisational characteristics may mean that some 
firms are also less inclined or capable of engaging in external knowledge 
sourcing.  Managerial attitudes towards risk tolerance (Garcia-Granero et 
al. 2014), or willingness to source knowledge from outside the firm 
(Bucharth et al. 2014), may impact on the relative importance of each 
market failure and the potential value of intervention.  
To develop our understanding of the importance of market failures in OI 
engagement, further research would be beneficial in examining the relative 
importance of these stages of OI engagement and associated market 
failures in different economic and innovation systems.  Empirical analyses 
could also adopt organisational perspectives in considering the relative 
importance of each market failure in the light of managerial and 
organisational characteristics.   
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Table 1: Studies illustrating average and estimated optimal levels of 
search breadth and depth 
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Table 2: Partnership development stages, market failures and 
intermediary roles 
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Figure 1: Logic model for OI Intermediary 
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